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ABSTRACT This paper examines what motivates university researchers to patent the results of
collaborative research with business firms. We provide evidence of the existence of a motivational
academic patenting space comprising (i) an industry-driven domain related to traditional-market
motives (protection of inventions that will be commercialized); (ii) a university-driven domain driven by
various (“heterodox”) motives related mostly to signalling specific research competences and (iii) a “hybrid”
publicly driven domain related to projects aligned to the research agendas of public sponsors. These
three types of motivations reflect the connections between academic patenting and different types of
innovation, and the roles of industry partners in proposing, financing and performing specific research
projects. We use data from 16 in depth case studies of innovations developed by Dutch universities to
provide preliminary empirical evidence of this typology of motivational spaces for patenting university
knowledge.
KEY WORDS: Patents, motivations, collaborations, university–industry interaction, signalling
JEL CODES: O34, O31, O38
1. Introduction
The increasing number of studies on academic patenting reflects a growing recognition of
the critical role of universities for economic development, and the fact that the financing of
university research relies heavily on the commercialization of research results.1 The 1980s’
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1 In line with previous studies, in this paper, we use the term ‘university patenting’ to refer to university-owned
patents, and academic patenting to indicate the broader set of both university-owned and university-invented patents
(Lissoni et al., 2008).
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US Bayh–Dole Act sets new rules for the ownership of university research results and
marked the emergence of a new context for academic patenting. Revisions to the regulation
of intellectual property rights (IPR) on university research results are taking place in many
other OECD countries. There is a general trend towards reinforcement of the incentives for
university patenting, with the aim of facilitating knowledge transfer (see OECD, 2003, for an
influential report that advocated policy changes).
Patents are a form of exclusionary rights granting temporary monopoly on the
commercial exploitation of inventions. The traditional motivation for a patent application is
the intention to appropriate some economic return from an invention, either through its direct
commercializing or by licensing it to a third party. However, some scholars have suggested
that other benefits, such as increasing bargaining power in technology agreements,
signalling specific research capabilities, gaining access to research networks or enhancing
reputation, may be influencing firms’ decisions to patent (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Bureth et al.,
2005; Penin, 2005; Fontana et al., 2006).
These various reasons may apply also to academic patenting and it is useful also to
make a distinction between traditional and “heterodox”motivations in these cases (MacLeod,
1988). Traditional motivations are related to the expectation of appropriating some economic
return from the legal protection of an invention provided by a patent. ‘Heterodox’ motivations
include exploitation of a patent for purposes not directly linked to the protection of an
invention: for example, to enhance reputation, signal competences, etc.2
Most policy discussion on academic patenting so far revolves around the effects of
patent protection, and tends to ignore the specific motivations underlying the academic
researcher’s decision to patent. If academic researchers patent for other reasons than
protecting the economic returns from their inventions, then universities patenting policies
may be misguided and need to be realigned (Metcalfe, 1995).
Academic patenting seems to result from the analysis of the direct financial benefits
generated by the patent as well as the indirect benefits such as effect on the individual
researcher’s scientific reputation or bargaining power inside the university (Owen-Smith &
Powell, 2001; Baldini et al., 2007; Penin, 2010; D’Este & Perkman, 2011). Go¨ktepe-Hulten &
Maghagaonkar (2010) examine the importance of university researchers’ reputational versus
pecuniary motivations to explain patenting and disclosure behaviour, and find that heterodox
motivations are only important to explaining patenting by university researchers with no
experience of collaboration with industry. However, we do not know whether or not different
patenting motivations are associated with the specificities of the innovative process, in
particular, the organizational format and technological objectives. The characteristics of the
innovation development process may influence the patenting decision, especially under
collaborative arrangements between industry and university (Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Colyvas
et al., 2002; Verspagen, 2006).
2 The distinction between traditional and heterodox motivations for patenting was introduced by MacLeod (1988) in her
historical study of the English patent system. MacLeod noted that many patents granted in the period 1660–1800 were
aimed at being used as advertising devices or, in the case of amateur, ‘gentlemen’ inventors, for public recognition of
their scientific and technological efforts, rather than for the direct economic exploitation of a specific invention
(MacLeod, 1988, pp. 75–96).
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This study constitutes a preliminary exploration of academic patentingmotivations in the
context of collaborative projects with different organizational and technological character-
istics. We explore how traditional and heterodox patenting motives relate to different types of
innovation (“embryonic” vs. “ready-to-use”), different forms of financing and organizing
research, and different patent ownership. On the basis of 16 case studies on university–
industry collaborative projects in the Netherlands we propose and provide evidence of the
existence of a three-domain motivational space for academic patenting comprising: (i) an
industry-driven domain related to traditional-market motives (protection of inventions that will
be commercialized); (ii) a university-driven domain related to heterodox motives (mostly
related to the signalling of specific research competences); and (iii) a “hybrid” publicly driven
domain that includes projects aligned to the research agendas of public research sponsors.
This three-domain motivational space reflects the different connections between incentives
to patent and types of innovation, and the role of industry partners in proposing, financing and
performing specific research projects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the motives for academic
patenting; Section 3 proposes the conceptual framework for university patenting and
Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 discusses the characteristics of the projects in
each of the three motivational spaces, and the co-occurrence of patenting motivations,
innovation characteristics and involvement of an industry partner. Section 6 concludes with
some implications for policy.
2. Motives for Patenting
A patent is a legal tool that grants an inventor the temporary exclusive rights to produce, use
or market a specific invention. Traditionally, it was believed that in the absence of patent
protection, competitors would immediately copy the invention, at almost no cost, giving the
original inventor little hope of recouping the investment in the inventive activity (Verspagen,
2006). Empirical research on patenting motives, however, reveals a more complex picture.
First, in most industries (notable exceptions being chemicals and pharmaceuticals) first-
mover advantages and secrecy are considered to be far more effective methods than
patents for protecting innovations (Cohen et al., 2000). Second, patents are used frequently
by firms for other strategic objectives than protection of innovation. For example, the
Carnegie–Mellon survey revealed that alongside the usual motives of preventing copying
and generating revenue through licensing, patents are used to block rival patents, to
negotiate with other companies to prevent infringement suits, to enhance reputation and to
measure the performance of research and development (R&D) departments (Cohen et al.,
2000). Other studies show that patents can combine the traditional role of protection and
exclusion with the heterodox role of a negotiation and cooperation instrument (Hall &
Ziedonis, 2001; Bureth et al., 2005; Bureth & Penin, 2007). In other words, patents
simultaneously act to promote collaboration and protection. Bureth & Penin (2007) argue
that patents can be understood as architectural elements of complex modular products
because they protect against competition (within each module, they act as tools of exclusion
and protection) and foster cooperation (across modules). This heterodox role of patents is
more frequent in the area of life sciences (Bureth et al., 2005).
In the case of academic patents, the situation is more complex. As Verspagen (2006)
points out, university research can be regarded as a prime example of a system of
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patronage, in which the development of new knowledge is supported directly by public
funding. Therefore, university research is knowledge created by an incentive system, which,
from a historical point of view, has emerged as an alternative to the patent system. In this
perspective, the rationale underlying current policy measures that encourage the patenting
of university research findings appears to be ambiguous because these procedures
create incentives for investment in the production of new knowledge by actors whose
research efforts are supported by public funds (Jensen et al., 2003; Verspagen, 2006).
Not surprisingly, much of the research on academic patenting focuses on the effects of the
co-existence of these two incentive systems—public funding and patents—on the behaviour
of academic researchers. Several studies examine issues such as possible delays in the
publication of research results, diversion of effort from basic, fundamental research to more
“applied” work, etc. (Geuna & Nesta, 2006; Manjarre´s-Henrı´quez et al., 2008; Welsh et al.,
2008; Penin, 2010). Concern about the possible detrimental effects of patenting university
research results came to a head between 1910 and 1939 when some US universities begun
to take patents on some of their discoveries (see Metlay, 2006 for an interesting study of
these early discussion on the rationale for university patenting).
Empirical research on academic patents tends to focus on traditional reasons for
patenting (e.g. Colyvas et al., 2002; Jensen & Thursby, 2004). However, as already
mentioned, research on corporate patenting reveals that patenting can have many different
motives. This leads to questions about whether the patterns of motivations are similar for
university patenting and whether patenting occurs for other reasons than protection. Such an
investigation is important to assess the potential effects of recent public policy measures
designed to encourage university patenting.
Few studies examine heterodox and traditional motivations for academic patenting. In
the US, university patenting and disclosure behaviours seem to be affected by the
expectation of personal pecuniary rewards (e.g. Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001; Friedman &
Silberman, 2003). Studies using European data suggest that heterodox patenting motives,
such as access to research funds and resources, and reputation are more important (e.g.
Baldini et al., 2007). In particular, Go¨ktepe-Hulten & Maghagaonkar (2010), using survey
data, examine the importance of reputational and pecuniary reasons for patenting and
disclosure behaviours among university researchers—with and without industry-collabora-
tive experience. Their results suggest that heterodox motivations are only important for
explaining patenting by university researchers with no experience of collaboration with
industry, and that pecuniary motivations are negatively associated with disclosure and
patenting by university researchers with industry cooperative experience. Given the nature
of survey data, Go¨ktepe-Hulten & Maghagaonkar (2010) are unable to identify how these
motivations are associated with different types of innovative processes, and do not take
account of the organizational form or technological objective of collaborative projects with
industry.
However, the characteristics of the invention and its development process seem to
influence the motivations to patent, especially under collaborative arrangements between
industry and university (Colyvas et al., 2002; Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Verspagen, 2006).
Aghion & Tirole (1994) argue that the allocation of IPR in university–industry collaborations
is related to both the nature of the innovation and the characteristics of the research team.
The present study provides a preliminary exploration of academic patentingmotivations,
and especially heterodox and traditional incentives, in projects with different organizational
674 I.M. Bodas Freitas & A. Nuvolari
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and technological characteristics conducted in collaborationwith industry.Section3proposes
an interpretative framework for understanding the incentives for universities and academic
researchers to apply for patents on research findings.
3. Motivational Spaces for Patenting University Research Results
We start by considering that the motivations for university patenting are an outcome of the
context in which the new knowledge is generated. In other words, patenting of innovations
developed in collaboration with industry and developed autonomously by academic
researchers may have different intrinsic motivations. The reasons for patenting may vary
across different phases of development of an innovation (i.e. whether the innovation is at an
“embryonic” or “ready-to-use” stage). Also, university or industry ownership of the IPR of an
innovation seems to depend on the context of its development and the level of development
and applicability of the knowledge (Colyvas et al., 2002; Metlay, 2006; Verspagen, 2006).
Embryonic proof-of-concept as opposed to ready-to-use innovation is more likely to be
protected by a patent for heterodox reasons such as signalling and attracting partners that
could provide financial support for further development and refinement of the invention
(Colyvas et al., 2002; Bureth & Penin, 2007). Innovations that replace existing technologies
and open up new market opportunities are more likely to be patented for heterodox
motivations (Metlay, 2006). In both cases, although part of the reason for patenting may be
traditional protection, it is important for the inventor to attract new research partners and
resources to allow further development of the innovation (Geroski, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005).
Embryonic proof-of-concept and ready-to-use innovations tend to be developed in
different organizational environments, and have different objectives and arrangements for
eventual ownership. Proof-of-concept inventions developed by universities are typically
generated in “curiosity-driven” type of research contexts, supported by public funds and, for
these reasons, will be less suitable for immediate industrial application. University-owned
patents tend to refer more often to embryonic innovation based on public funds than private
patents (Colyvas et al., 2002; Azagra-Caro et al., 2006).
Innovations developed in contexts of limited interactions with industrial firms, or
autonomously by academic teams, are more likely to be patented for heterodox motivations
than innovations developed in direct cooperation with firms (Go¨ktepe-Hulten & Mahagaonkar,
2010). In the former case, patentingprovidesaway for academic researchers to signal to public
research sponsors, the quality and potential for industrial application of their ongoing research
and to attract private funds and partners for future innovation development projects (Geuna &
Nesta, 2006;Czarnitzkietal., 2011).Heterodoxmotivations for patentingmaybe less important
in contexts of strong interactionwith industrial firms, especially if these firmsparticipate actively
in thedesignandperformanceof the researchcollaboration.Hence,university researcherswith
experience of collaboration and interest of continued cooperation with industry may mimicking
the traditional market-led patenting motivations of their industrial partners who are more likely
to expect and understand the market potential of an innovation (Slaughter et al., 2002).
Based on these considerations, we suggest a typology of university–industry interaction
comprising three broad domains of motivations for academic patenting based on the type of
innovationand theorganizational andfinancial contexts of the researchproject (seeFigure 1).
Figure 1 considers a research project as spanning three dimensions: (i) the degree of
involvement of industrial partners; (ii) nature of the innovation and (iii) type of motivations for
Traditional Versus Heterodox Motives 675
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the decision to patent. This leads to the identification of three types of research projects:
industry driven where patenting is mainly for traditional motives; university driven where
patenting is likely to be driven by heterodoxmotives and publicly driven “hybrid” type projects
where patenting combines traditional and heterodox motives.
Figure 2 depicts the characteristics of each motivational space for university patenting
behaviour. The industry driven refers to collaborative R&D projects where a firm that is
familiar with the research competencies of the university based on previous collaborations
Patenting - Heterodox motives
Active Role of industrial partner
Innov. 'ready-to-use'
Patenting- Traditional motives
Industry-driven
University-driven
Publicly-driven
No/ Small Role of industrial
partner
Innov. - 'embryonic'
Figure 1. An interpretative framework for university patenting. Note: Elaboration by the authors based on the review of
the literature.
Industry-driven
Firm provides the idea and
finances and performs research
University performs research and
gives advice to firm
Research project fits firm's R&D
agenda
Innovation ‘ready-to-use’
Traditional Motivations
University-driven
University performs research
Firm provides testing, equipment
and/or feedback
Public or university funded research
Curiosity, policy-driven research
Mainly ‘proof-of-concepts’
Heterodox Motivations
Publicly-driven
Development of technical proof-of-concepts
and prototypes to respond to policy
(procurement)
With elements from the Industry-driven and
University-driven models
Figure 2. The three-pronged motivational space of university patenting. Note: Elaboration by the authors.
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or professional contacts proposes a collaborative project or asks for help in resolving a
technological problem. These projects are often high on the firm’s research agenda and its in-
house research groups are likely to contribute directly. Depending on the type of research,
the university researchersmay perform their research at the firm’s facilities in order to access
specific equipment and facilities. The firm tends to finance most of the research costs. These
types of projects may be aimed at improvements to existing technological applications,
prototypes or product commercialization. Patents are typically aimed at protection and, in
most cases, are owned by the firm. University researchers working in close collaboration with
industry researchers tend to reproduce the patenting motivations of their industry partner.
Continuation of the project and direction of the research may depend on the firm’s interest in
supporting it by providing access to equipment, testing facilities and/or funds and the
possibilities for the firm to appropriate some benefits from the collaboration.
University-driven research tends to be conducted in an academic or government
institute and be mostly “curiosity driven” although it may be the result of some contract
research and may lead to a by-product innovation. Innovation is usually developed in
research projects performed almost exclusively by university researchers; if a firm is
involved this usually consists of provision of material, equipment or technical feedback.
University-driven projects are usually financed by public research grants or exploit university
resources such as masters and research students. Patenting of research outcomes (usually
proofs of concept or substitute for existing technologies) tends to be driven by heterodox
motives, including signalling of research competences, access to research funds and
opportunities to continue the research agenda.
Publicly driven research refers to projects related to technical proofs of concept and
prototypes aligned to the research agendas of the public research sponsors. These projects
rely on a mix of private and public fundings, and involve different forms of organization of
research activities between the university and the firm. They tend to be related to
innovations to substitute for existing technologies. Patenting the results of these projects is
led by traditional as well as heterodox motives.
4. Data and Methodology
The empirical evidence used in this paper relates to academic patenting in the Netherlands.
Prima facie, the Dutch case is particularly interesting. The Netherlands has the highest
shares of business-owned patents based on university knowledge and business patents
with university inventors (Verspagen, 2006). Recent estimates suggest that 4.3% of Dutch
patenting with the European Patent Office (EPO) relates to academic inventors (similar to
the levels in other European countries such as France and Italy) and that on 1% of Dutch
EPO patents, the assignee is a Dutch university (the corresponding percentages for France
and Italy are lower) (Baselli & Pellicciari, 2007; Lissoni et al., 2008).
The Dutch university system historically has enjoyed a high level of autonomy from
central government. Funding of Dutch universities comes from three main streams. The first
is public funding which is allocated according to numbers of students and fields of study. The
second stream is represented by funding for research, allocated through competitive grants
awarded by the research councils (the most important is the NWO, Nederlandse
Organisation voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek). The third funding source is contract
Traditional Versus Heterodox Motives 677
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research involving both business firms and public partners. The share of this third stream is
about 30% at the national level (VNSU, 2012).
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) began to be established in Dutch universities
during the 1980s and early 1990s. In the European context, Dutch TTOs provide effective
IPR consulting services (OECD, 2003; Verspagen, 2004). The Dutch university system does
not acknowledge the so-called “professor’s privilege”, which means that Dutch universities
and public research organizations can assume ownership of the inventions made by their
researchers. The decision to patent, therefore, is not confined to individual researchers, but is
the outcome of discussion or negotiation with the TTO. Although the legislation has not
changed, the Dutch government has been encouraging more patenting of the results of
academic research (Minister of Economic Affairs, 2003; Verspagen, 2004). This can be seen
as part of a broader shift in Dutch innovation policy, which increasingly is trying to link public
research funding to industrial applications that provide direct contributions to social welfare.
We collected novel project/collaboration level data from 30 case studies of university–
industry collaboration, to investigate the dynamics of the organizational and technological
structure of the cooperative projects. The unit of analysis is the piece of knowledge
developed or co-developed at the university and transferred to the firm, regardless of
whether it is used or commercialized.3 We focused on completed projects where the
knowledge developed was transferred to the firm, independently of whether the firm has
recognized its value or decided to use it. By focusing only on completed projects we were
able to collect data covering both project origins and achieved outcomes. However, it may
be that this choice of completed collaborative projects biases the sample towards successful
cases, although we found a mix of performance.4 Also, we focus on patenting motivations
rather than performance per se.
We used several strategies to identify our cases, including interviews with the chairs of
research departments in the faculties of mechanical engineering, biotechnology, chemistry,
applied physics and electrical engineering in two technical universities in the Netherlands
(Eindhoven and Delft); library searches for PhD theses completed in the previous five years;
records of research grants awarded by national research councils; interviews with directors
of university TTOs and identification of professors with large numbers of industrial patents.
Since this work is exploratory we are interested in variety in our sample of cases. The 30
cases demonstrate variety in forms of funding, scientific disciplines, and origin and
development of inventions (university-driven research; firms proposing project ideas to the
university; results of on-going collaboration).
To enable codification and statistical comparison of the cases, we developed a
standardized protocol for collecting data from university researchers and industry
researchers and managers participating in the specific projects. This protocol included over
3Among the 30 cases, we found three levels of knowledge transfer: knowledge transferred but not valued or exploited
by the firm; knowledge that was absorbed by the firm which regarded it as valuable but did not exploit it further and
knowledge that was exploited in further research, product development, process improvements or commercialization
of new products.
4 In 2 of the 30 cases, the collaborative project did not achieve the scientific or technological objectives defined at the
start of the project; in four cases the outcomes were beyond what was expected; in 17 cases, projects led to
commercialization efforts or plans for commercialization of new products. The universities evaluated 26 projects as
completely positive; the firms were more critical and reported complete satisfaction with outcomes in only 21 cases.
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200 questions focusing on the processes of knowledge development and transfer between
universities and firms, which includes (Bozeman, 2000; Bercovitz & Feldman, 2006)
(i) characteristics of the innovation; (ii) identification of project origins; (iii) design and
performance of the R&D project; (iv) degree and forms of knowledge transfer between
university and firm; (v) impact of the knowledge transfer process and (vi) main characteristics
of university researchers and participating firms.5 Collection of data in each case involved
between two and five interviews with the university and industry partners.
We identified 16 cases from the original 30 case studies that involved academic patent
applications, that is, applications based on a decision to patent by the university researcher.
Our sample of 16 cases includes 4 cases related mainly to Mechanical Engineering, 3 in
Biology andMedicine, 3 in to Applied Physics, 3 in Electrical Engineering, 2 in Chemistry and
Chemical Engineering and 1 in Bio-mechanics. In nine cases, the idea for a collaborative
project came from the university researchers; three of these were former industry
researchers and two were part-time professors. Five cases were mainly proposed by firms;
the others were continuations of previous or on-going collaborative research. In relation to
funding, two cases were supported by public subsidies, five were fully financed by the firms,
and the remaining nine were funded by a mix of public and private sources.6
Table 1 provides information on the technology, disciplinary affiliation, type of funding
for development, relative size of research team in yearly full-time equivalents, project timing
and timing of patent application and its ownership.
In relation to timing of patent applications, in 10 cases, projects were built on previous
patents; 6 were patents on university knowledge (two owned by the firm). In 15 cases,
patents were awarded during or towards the end of the project; in only 2 cases was the
patent university owned.
In four cases, the project led to the creation of a spin-off firm, one of which was a start-
up. In three cases, the spin-off was the form used to implement the research project because
it facilitated access to research sponsorship and collaborative agreements.
The categorization of innovations into embryonic or ready-to-use innovations is difficult
because the meaning of these terms differs across disciplinary fields and industrial contexts.
To address this, we create two objective dichotomous variables that can be used as proxies:
“substitute versus complement to existing technologies” and “degree of technology
development” (Geroski, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005). The variable “substitute versus complement
to existing technologies” defined in terms of knowledge application rather than knowledge
characteristics, considers whether the existing innovation complements or substitutes the
existing technology (Metcalfe, 2005). The variable “degree of technology development”,
reflects the different development phases leading to new technology and knowledge at the
end of the research project, and considers whether the project resulted in proof of concept
rather than a developed crafted technology or industrial application. These variables are
based on information reported by interviewees on the characteristics of the innovation,
complemented in some cases by secondary sources.
Innovations that are complementary to existing technologies represent less complex
ways to improve technology efficiency and market performance. Innovations that represent
5 The protocol consists of mainly open questions and some yes/no questions.
6 Eleven cases relate to the University of Eindhoven, three to the University of Leiden and two to Delft University.
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substitutes for existing technologies may involve deeper organizational changes to establish
a market (Geroski, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005). Therefore, the motivations for patenting these two
types of innovations can be expected to be different (see Section 3). This classification
allows us to control for disciplinary differences in the innovation development time frame.
Hence, these dichotomous variables capture the degree of substitution/complementarity
with existing technologies and degree of technology development, which allows comparison
across disciplinary fields and industrial contexts.
Among the 16 cases, 12 focus on knowledge related to technologies that are
substitutes for the existing ones. Eight cases led mainly to development of proofs of concept
of new technologies and eight cases resulted in crafted prototypes and industrial
applications.
We use data collected from both university and industry partners to characterize the
innovation development process, the innovation and the forms of financing and organizing
the research project. We use information provided by university researchers participating in
the 16 cases to reconstruct their motivations for applying for patents on pieces of new
knowledge generated during the project. We coded the motivations reported by university
researchers into seven different motivations, traditional (three) and heterodox (four). In this
study we examine motivations in the context of collaboration, which involves teams of
researchers. Consequently, we include (all) the motivations reported by the university
researchers involved in the innovation development project rather focusing on the
motivations of individuals, departments or universities.
5. Motivations for Academic Patenting
5.1 Motivations for Patenting, Types of Innovation, Research Funding and Patent Ownership
We codified the motivations reported by university researchers into traditional market-
related and heterodox-signalling motivations. The traditional-market patenting motivations
identified are “Securing the benefits from future product development”, “Guaranteed
ownership of IPR on new products” and “Return on R&D investment from sale of innovation”.
Securing the benefits from future product development refers mainly a pre-emptive claim by
the patent owner on the rights over future developments based on innovation. Guaranteed
ownership of IPR on new products’ allows the patent owner to commercialize the product
without others being able to claim right or inappropriate use of their IPR. Selling the
information to obtain a return on R&D investment is directed mainly to obtaining a (partial)
return on earlier investment in research when the firm is no longer interested in directly
applying the innovation.
The heterodox-signalling motivations identified are “Publication of valuable research
results”, “Signalling to potential (industry) research partners”, “Attracting venture capital”
and “Attracting research funds”. The first refers to the diffusion of valuable research results
and building scientific and industrial reputation. Signalling to potential partners is aimed at
attracting future collaboration partners demonstrating technical capability and assuring
exclusivity of research results. Attracting research funds is aimed at attracting (mainly
public) funds for new research projects along similar lines. Attracting venture capital is
mainly to fund the cash flow of spin-offs in addition to R&D.
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Table 2 provides information on the frequency of the motivations identified by
researchers involved in the case projects, and on the degree of complementarity/substitu-
tion among motivations. In all cases, one of the motivations for patenting was in the
traditional category. In 10 cases, at least one motivation was heterodox. Securing the
benefits from future product development and Guaranteed ownership of IPR on new
products’ were cited in 11 cases. Signalling to research partners and Attracting R&D
sponsorships were the motivation in eight cases and Publication of valuable research was
the motivation in seven cases.
Heterodox and traditional patenting motivations, therefore, are not mutually exclusive,
which is in line with research on motivations for industrial patenting (Bureth et al., 2005;
Bureth & Penin, 2007). Only the traditional motivation of Guaranteed ownership of IPR on
new products seems to be a substitute for heterodox motivations (significant and negative
correlation coefficient). It is somewhat surprising that traditional motives (compared with
heterodox motives) do not seem to complement each other (no significant correlations were
found).
Table 3 provides information on frequency and linear association between the
motivations for patenting and the characteristics of innovation in relation to the degree of
technological development and substitution among existing technologies.
Eight projects focused on development of proofs of concept, and patenting in all these
cases has heterodox motives. Eleven cases were substitutes for rather than complements
to existing technologies; heterodox motivations were reported in nine cases. Heterodox
motivations for patenting seemmore likely to be related to proofs of concept and innovations
that are substitutes for existing technologies.7 This suggests that the more embryonic the
knowledge produced by the project the more likely the motivations for patenting will be
heterodox.
The traditional motive of securing the benefits from future product development is
reported in seven cases focusing on development of proof of concept, and nine projects
related to the development of substitutes for existing technologies. Hence, there does not
seem to be a link between traditional market-related motivations for patenting and the
characteristics of the innovation. Still, obtaining a return on R&D investment seems to be
related mainly to innovations complementing rather than substituting for existing
technologies. An innovation that is considered to be readily marketable is one for which
there is an already existing supply and demand market, that is, an innovation that
complements an existing technology (Geroski, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005).
Table 4 provides information on the frequency and association between the motivations
for patenting and the role of the project’s industrial partners.
In 11 cases, the industry partner participated in the design of the research. In 10 of
these cases, the motivations for patenting were traditional, and 7 there were heterodox
motivations. In research projects where the industry partner actively participated in the
research activity (seven cases), traditional patenting motivations are slightly more frequent.
In these cases the traditional patenting motivation was guaranteeing IPR on new products.
In only three of these seven cases were heterodox-signalling motives reported as reasons
7Heterodox motives for patenting seem particularly frequent in research projects in Biology and Medicine.
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for patenting. Since industry partners invest resources and time in collaborative projects,
and interact with the university researchers, motivations related to the appropriation of
market value, which tend to be more aligned to achieving immediate industrial applications,
are more frequent. In five cases, the industry partner financed a large part of the research
activity; in none of these cases was access to venture capital identified as a motivation for
patenting, and heterodox motivations were reported in only two cases. In four of these five
cases, the motives were traditional. Thus, the evidence suggests that the higher the
involvement of the industry partner in the research project the less likely that the motives for
patenting will be heterodox.
Finally, we examined the frequency and linear association between patenting
motivations and the existence of previous patents including all previous patents, previous
patents based only on university developed knowledge and previous university-owned
patents The impulse to patent seems not to depend on the existence of a previous patent
(i.e. of a patent granted prior to the emergence of the new research results). Only the
motivation of securing the benefits from future product development was found to be slightly
more frequent in collaborative research to develop previously existing patents, independent
of the type of their patent ownership.
We find a weak association between patenting motivations and ownership of patents
issued during or towards the end of a research project. In the case of research results
belonging to the university (leading to a university-owned patent), patenting seems slightly
more likely to be motivated by the heterodox objectives of publishing valuable research
results and building scientific and industrial reputation; traditional-market patenting
motivations seem less important in the case of university patenting. The motivations for
academic patenting, therefore, may depend on whether the university retains (or not) the
property rights to the results of a collaborative research project.8
5.2 Typology of University–Industry Collaborative Projects and Motivations for Academic
Patenting
To explore the applicability of the taxonomy of motivational spaces to patenting of university
knowledge, we split the cases into three groups—cases where no heterodox motivations
were found, cases with at least three heterodox motivations and cases with one or two
heterodox motives—and analyzed similarities and differences within and across groups.
First, we analyze the characteristics of the six cases where patenting was not led by
heterodox motives. Five of the projects were proposed to the university by firms and fitted
with the firms’ research agendas. None of the projects resulted only in proof of concept; all
resulted in improvements and refinements to existing technologies. In three cases, the
projects led to commercialization of a new product. In two cases, the innovation was a
substitute for an existing technology. Two cases were in the area of Mechanical
Engineering, two were in Electrical Engineering and two were in Applied Physics.
Four of the six cases were financedmainly by the firms, which participated directly in the
research. In three cases university researchers joined the firms’ research teams. A fifth
8No significant relationship was found between patenting motivations and the type of patent (domestic/international)
issued.
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case, which was financed mainly by public research sponsors and conducted at the
university, was initiated and led by a part-time professor who was employed by the industry
firm. The sixth case was a university department that had been working on an
industry-related problem for over a decade before the methodology used to address the
problem resulted in a spin-off. When the product was developed and patented the university
department closed down. This group of cases fits the industry-driven domain of motivations
for patenting university-developed knowledge. Strong involvement and the interest of
university researchers in industry’s activities seems to reproduce the market-related
patenting motivations traditionally applying to their industry counterparts.
The next six cases involve at least three heterodox motives for patenting. All relate to
proof-of-concept outcomes that complement existing technologies. Five of the projects were
financed by public sponsorship or university funds. These projects were developed mainly at
the university. Industry partners were not directly involved in performing the research,
although they provided material, equipment, testing facilities and feedback. Three cases
were in the areas of Biology and Medicine, the remaining three respectively were in
Chemistry, Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering. This group of cases belongs
to the university-driven domain patenting motivations.
In the last four cases, patenting motives were both traditional and heterodox. Three
refer to development of substitutes for existing technologies; two refer to proofs of concept
(one project was discontinued as soon as the firm obtained proof-of-concept knowledge).
The projects were in the four disciplinary areas of: Mechanical Engineering, Medicine,
Chemical Engineering and Applied Physics. This “intermediate” group overlaps with the
previous two groups. In one case, before engaging in the collaborative project, the firm had
patented university knowledge, which, the university permitted to secure industry
collaboration (the university also reported some of the firm’s pre-emptive traditional-market
motives). In another case, a university-owned patent, patented for heterodox motivations,
existed prior to the collaborative research project, which was aimed at developing
knowledge related to the existing patent. The firm patented the emerging results while the
collaborative project was still running. The motivations reported include the heterodox
motives of attracting other industry research partners and accessing public funds, as well as
some traditional-market reasons. The remaining two projects were financedmainly by public
research funds and patenting was motivated by diffusion of research results and attracting
more research funds.
This analytical and descriptive exercise of clustering cases according to the presence of
heterodox motives for patenting provides some insights into the multivariate nature of the
motivational spaces encompassing patenting decision. It discusses how and why research
projects that differ according to the role of the industry partner in proposing and financing the
project and participating in the research tend to produce different types of innovations and
result in different motivations for patenting. The empirical evidence supports the taxonomy
of motivational spaces for patenting derived in Section 3.
5.3 Three Typical Cases
In this section, we summarize three projects that can be considered typical of the industry-
driven, university-driven or public-driven domains according to the patenting motivations
identified by the researchers involved in the projects.
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Industry-driven collaborative project. The invention was an improved control system for
complex manufacturing machines (e.g. wafer scanners). The invention process involved
collaboration between the Department of Mechanical Engineering in a technical university
and a leading Dutch manufacturer of integrated circuits. The motivation for the project was
the company’s need to improve the efficiency of its wafer scanners. Aware of these
technical concerns, the university project leader proposed the setting up an “applied” PhD
research project with the aim of designing more efficient control system software. Although
the innovation project was formally proposed by the university partner, through previous
contacts the company had expressed its need for the innovation. The PhD research
project was initiated (the PhD researcher’s salary was covered by the company) and
proceeded smoothly. The research was developed based on interaction between the
university and industry researchers; a large part of the PhD student’s time was spent at the
firm. The project led to the creation of working prototypes of software control systems,
some of which were adopted by the industry partner. The knowledge generated by the
project was protected by six patents, which were owned by the industry partner. This is a
clear case of industry-driven innovation. The industrial partner has a technical problem; the
university partner with the appropriate experience (perceived through previous contacts) is
approached to provide a workable solution. For the university partner, resolution of this
technical problem for the firm did not provide particular tensions or distractions from
ongoing research (the PhD project was completed on time). The knowledge generated by
the project was geared to solving a specific industry problem and the results were
appropriated by the industry partner, who then applied the patent protection in a
“traditional” way. The industry partner controlled all dissemination of the knowledge (e.g.
all publications related to the project were checked carefully by the firm’s IPR department;
findings were published with minor delays). The university partner was not frustrated by
this level of checking and the slight delays because of experience of interacting with firms
for research (supervisor) and strong interest in interacting with the business world (PhD
student).
University-driven collaborative project. The innovation is inorganic crystalline phosphors
for labelling macromolecules in biological systems. It represents a major improvement over
other labelling methods such as radioactive labelling techniques. The potential application of
this technology is medical diagnostics. The project originated with the university. The idea
was the result of PhD research conducted in the Molecular Cellular Biology Department in
the Medical Centre of a large Dutch university. As soon as the potential of the innovation
became clear, the university department applied for a patent on the research results. This
was not a “ready-to-use” innovation and major development work was required for the
technology to be applied within a diagnostic tool. After the patent was granted, research
continued funded by NWO grants. It is likely that the patent played a role in the award of this
funding to the department. At the same time, the department began to look for potential
industrial partners that might be interested in developing the technology. After careful
scanning, a suitable industrial partner was identified. It was a US company already engaged
in work on the use of crystalline phosphors unknowingly using technology that likely
infringed the university patent. A cooperation agreement was drafted and the US company
bought the patent rights. This is an example of the co-existence of traditional and heterodox
patenting motives. The original patent was used by the university partner to signal-specific
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research competencies and reputation. During the collaboration project, the patent rights
were transferred to the industry partner that used them for traditional protection and
commercializing of the innovation. In this second phase, as the invention was improved and
developed by the university and the firm together, the industry partner applied for additional
patents. Curiously, after a somewhat tortuous history and due to difficulties related to making
the technology viable for practical application and to identifying the market for the technology,
the original patent reverted to the university department (the original cooperation contract
included a clause about “abandonment” of the patent), a year before it expired, since the firm
had decided not to commercialize.9 The university continued to work on this project and was
awarded a research grant from a US sponsor.
Publicly driven collaborative project. The innovation is a flywheel for application in
automobiles to support propulsion of the engine when rapid acceleration is needed.
This device, which can be retro-fitted, has the potential to economize on fuel. The innovation
was the outcome of a collaborative project involving the Department of Mechanical
Engineering in a Dutch technical university and a Dutch manufacturer of transmission
systems for automobiles. The partnership was supported by a government programme to
support environmentally friendly research projects—especially through university–industry
partnerships. The project involved several PhD researchers whose assigned task was to
deliver a “proof-of-concept” of a flywheel system. The project led to four patent applications.
One of the outcomes of the project was the creation of a spin-off company, since the original
companywas not interested in diversifying and exploiting the innovation. A university spin-off,
owned jointly by the firm and the researchers, was seen as the best way to commercialize
the invention. Accordingly, patent rights were transferred to the spin-off company.
The technology in question was not immediately applicable, but was developed beyond the
embryonic stage. In this case there was a combination of traditional (secure market returns)
and heterodox motivations (attract sponsoring and venture capital) for academic patenting.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposed an exploratory framework to examine the motives for academic
patenting in different types of university– industry collaborative research projects.
Consistent with the previous literature, we proposed three typologies related to the
differences in types of innovation, organizational format of research projects and
motivations for patenting. Industry-driven collaborative projects lead to patenting mainly
for traditional-market related motives; university driven collaborative projects involve several
heterodox motives related to the need for researchers to find industrial partners for future
knowledge development, to increase access to public R&D funding, or to support spin-off
creation and growth (venture capital and public support). Publicly driven projects, aligned to
the research agendas of public sponsors, result in patenting for a combination of traditional
and heterodox motives. This three-domain space reflects the different links between
9 In most of our cases, IPR agreements were not formally established before the collaborative project involving the
university and the firm was initiated. IPR agreements applied mainly to projects in Biology. Projects funded by national
research sponsors have to abide by the IPR rules set by the research sponsor.
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patenting motivations and types of innovation, and the role of industrial partners in
proposing, financing and performing specific research projects. Our in-depth evidence on 16
cases of innovations developed or co-developed in Dutch universities supports this
taxonomy.
Our evidence suggests that traditional motives for patenting apply to almost all
patents, and that heterodox and traditional patenting motivations are not mutually
exclusive. Heterodox motivations for patenting are more likely in the case of innovations
that are “embryonic”/proof of concept or are radical substitutes for existing technologies.
They are also more frequent if research is public financed, and performed mostly by
the university leading to a university patent application. Our results suggest also that
university researchers, with experience of industry collaboration or interest in future
interactions with industry partners, are likely to reproduce traditional market-related
motives for patenting.
The most important implication for policy-makers and TTO managers is that academic
inventors may be motivated to apply for patents for heterodox reasons. These reasons have
generally been ignored in the literature on university patenting, which is unfortunate because
they have some implications for policy. Heterodox motivations for patenting, including
signalling competences, attracting industrial partners and accessing research funds, may be
regarded as positive by policy makers, since they are seen as demonstrating the university’s
effort to diffuse the results of academic research and to engage in technology transfer.
However, it should be remembered that all patents involve a reduction in social welfare via
their effect on reducing competition. In some cases, these negative effects are exacerbated
by the effect of a patent related to blocking subsequent technological developments (hold
up problems). Innovation policy should limit patenting to only what is required to stimulate
investment in the inventive activity.
Second, patents, especially university patents, represent only the commercial and
codified aspects of innovation and effective knowledge transfer between university and
industry, in most cases, requires articulation using more informal interaction, such as
informal contacts, open communication, collaboration and consulting, than the simple
licensing of a patent (Cohen et al., 2002; Bekkers & Bodas Freitas, 2008).
Third, our evidence suggests that researchers with longer experience and/or interest in
interacting with industry firms tend to reproduce the latter’s objectives and motivations.
Hence, too much industry involvement in academic research may restrict communication
among scientists because of the secrecy rules set by firms and their keenness to
commercialize research results and to patent (Slaughter et al., 2002; Welsh et al., 2008). It
may also undermine future pay-offs from academic research not only because of the
incentive to focus less on basic curiosity-driven research, but also because it inverts the
values of traditional academic freedom (Slaughter et al., 2002; Goldfarb, 2008).
Current incentives to patent research results such as those introduced by many
European countries emulating US regulations and practices (see Mowery & Sampat, 2005,
for an overview of these attempts to emulate the Bayh-Dole Act) may be exacerbating
university budget constraints because they favour patenting at an early stage in the
research. As some authors point out, patents are becoming a double-edged policy sword
and the balance between their positive and negative effects (especially related to hold
up problems that delay follow-up innovations) is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve
(Bessen & Meurer, 2008).
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The evidence in this paper points to the existence of heterodox motivations for
academic patenting but does not shed direct light on the relevance of the consequences of
heterodox patenting motives. In light of the existing literature and the evidence in this paper,
and until we have a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon of heterodox
motivations for patenting, we would recommend a more cautious approach to academic
patenting.
Our study has some limitations that point to avenues for future research. First the
analysis uses unique project level data and, necessarily, relies on a small sample of
observations. This limits the type of statistical analysis possible, and means our results are
exploratory. Further research is needed on larger samples that exploit different methods of
enquiry and analysis. In particular, it would be useful to establish the relative importance of
our three “ideal” types. Second, we focus on the motivations for academic patenting, under
different collaborative arrangements, and in relation to completed projects. Academic
patenting of research results with no industry involvement may fall into the university-driven
motivation domain (Go¨ktepe-Hulten & Mahagaonkar, 2010). However, university patenting
leading to the creation of university spin-offs by academics, with no industry involvement
may also be the result of traditional-market-related motivations. Similarly, academic patent
applications in relation to collaborative research in projects cancelled before the patent is
granted may be due to heterodox motivations. Further research is needed to address
academic motivations in different contexts.
Third, we rely on case studies of university–industry collaboration in the Netherlands.
Some characteristics of the motivational spaces might be specific to the Dutch institutional
environment—its university regulations, academic career procedures, science policies and
research council operations. Research is needed to examine whether these findings could
be generalized to other countries given cross-country differences in institutional and careers
arrangements.
Acknowledgements
This project was awarded a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO). We would like to thank Michael van der Borgh; Dirk Veersteg, Valentina Tartari,
Wouter Smid and Rex van Eijk for excellent research assistance. Moreover, we want
to thank Joaquin Azagra-Caro, Pablo D’Este, Julien Penin and Xavier Vence for their
constructive comments.
References
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1994) The management of innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, pp. 1185–1209.
Azagra-Caro, J. M., Carayol, N. and Llerena, P. (2006) Patent production at a European research university: exploratory evidence at the
laboratory level, Journal of Technology Transfer, 31, pp. 257–268.
Baldini, N., Grimaldi, R. and Sobrero, M. (2007) To patent or not to patent? A survey of Italian inventors on motivations, incentives, and
obstacles to university patenting, Scientometrics, 70, pp. 333–354.
Baselli, S. and Pellicciari, F. (2007) Academic patents and technology transfer in the Netherlands. An empirical analysis, Master Thesis,
Faculty of Engineering, Brescia, Italy.
Bekkers, R. and Bodas Freitas, I. M. (2008) Analysing knowledge transfer channels between universities and industry: to what degree do
sectors also matter? Research Policy, 37, pp. 1837–1853.
Traditional Versus Heterodox Motives 693
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
sa
be
l M
ari
a B
od
as
 Fr
eit
as
] a
t 1
4:4
1 0
8 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
Bercovitz, J. and Feldman, M. (2006) Entrepreneurial universities and technology transfer: a conceptual framework for understanding
knowledge-based economic development, Journal of Technology Transfer, 31, pp. 175–188.
Bessen, J. and Meurer, M. (2008) Patent Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Bozeman, B. (2000) Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research and theory, Research Policy, 29, pp. 627–655.
Bureth, A. and Pe´nin, J. (2007) Modular innovations and distributed processes: the case of genetically engineered vaccines, European
Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 20(2), pp. 251–274.
Bureth, A., Levy, R., Pe´nin, J. and Wolff, S. (2005) Strategic reasons for patenting: between exclusion and coordination rationales, Rivista
di Politica Economica, 95, pp. 19–46.
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R. and Walsh, J. P. (2000) Protecting their intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and why U.S.
manufacturing firms patent (or not). Working Paper No. 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R. and Walsh, J. P. (2002) Links and impacts: the influence of public research on Industrial R&D,Management
Science, 48, pp. 1–23.
Colyvas, J., Crow, M., Gelijns, A., Mazzoleni, R., Nelson, R., Rosenberg, N. and Sampat, B. N. (2002) How do university inventions get into
practice? Management Science, 48, pp. 61–72.
Czarnitzki, D., Hussinger, K. and Schneider, C. (2011) Commercializing academic research: the quality of faculty patenting, Industrial and
Corporate Change, 20(5), pp. 1403–1437.
D’Este, P. and Perkman, M. (2011) Why do academics engage with industry? The entrepreneurial university and individual motivations,
Journal of Technology Transfer, 36(3), pp. 316–339.
Fontana, R., Geuna, A. andMatt, M. (2006) Factors affecting university-industry R&D projects: the importance of searching, screening and
signalling, Research Policy, 35, pp. 309–323.
Friedman, J. and Silberman, J. (2003) University technology transfer: do incentives, management, and location matter? The Journal of
Technology Transfer, 28, pp. 17–30.
Geroski, P. A. (2000) Models of technology diffusion, Research Policy, 29, pp. 603–625.
Geuna, A. and Nesta, L. (2006) University patenting and its effects on academic research, The emerging European evidence, Research
Policy, 35, pp. 790–807.
Goldfarb, B. (2008) The effect of government contracting on academic research: does the source of funding affect scientific output,
Research Policy, 37(1), pp. 41–58.
Go¨ktepe-Hulten, D. and Mahagaonkar, P. (2010) Inventing and patenting activities of scientists: in the expectation of money or reputation?
Journal of Technology Transfer, 34, pp. 401–423.
Hall, B. H. and Ziedonis, R. H. (2001) The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the US semiconductor industry,
1979–1995, Rand Journal of Economics, 32, pp. 101–128.
Jensen, R. and Thursby, M. (2004) Patent licensing and the research university. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper
10758. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10758
Jensen, R. A., Thursby, J. G. and Thursby, M. C. (2003) Disclosure and licensing of university inventions: The best we can do with the s**t
we get to work with, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(9), pp. 1271–1300.
Lissoni, F., Llerena, P., McKelvey, M. and Sanditov, B. (2008) Academic patenting in Europe: new evidence from the KEINS database,
Research Evaluation, 17, pp. 87–102.
MacLeod, C. (1988) Inventing the Industrial Revolution. The English Patent System, 1660–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Manjarre´s-Henrı´quez, L., Gutie´rrez-Gracia, A. and Vega-Jurado, J. (2008) Coexistence of university-industry relations and academic
research: barrier to or incentive for scientific productivity, Scientometrics, 76(3), pp. 561–576.
Metcalfe, J. S. (1995) Technology systems and technology policy in an evolutionary framework, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19(1),
pp. 25–46.
Metcalfe, J. S. (2005) Ed Mansfield and the diffusion of innovation: an evolutionary connection, Journal of Technology Transfer, 30,
pp. 171–181.
Metlay, G. (2006) Reconsidering renormalization: stability and change in 20th Century views on university patents, Social Studies of
Science, 36(4), pp. 565–597.
Minister of Economic Affairs (2003), Innovatiebrief. In actie voor innovatie. Aanpak van de Lissabon ambitie, Den Haag.
Mowery, D. and Sampat, B. N. (2005) The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and university-industry technology transfer: a model for other OECD
governments? Journal of Technology Transfer, 30, pp. 115–127.
694 I.M. Bodas Freitas & A. Nuvolari
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
sa
be
l M
ari
a B
od
as
 Fr
eit
as
] a
t 1
4:4
1 0
8 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
OECD (2003) Turning Science into Business. Patenting and Licensing at Public Research Organizations (Paris: OECD).
Owen Smith, J. and Powell, W. W. (2001) To patent or not: faculty decisions and institutional success at technology transfer, Journal of
Technology Transfer, 26, pp. 99–114.
Penin, J. (2005) Patents versus ex post rewards: a new look, Research Policy, 34, pp. 641–656.
Penin, J. (2010) On the consequences of patenting university research: lessons from a survey of French academic inventors, Industry &
Innovation, 17(5), pp. 445–468.
Slaughter, S., Campbell, T., Holleman, M. and Morgan, E. (2002) The ‘traffic’ in graduate students: graduate students as tokens of
exchange between academe and industry, Science, Technology & Human Values, 27(2), pp. 282–313.
VNSU (2012), Research universities in the Netherlands, discussion paper, Amsterdam.
Verspagen, B. (2004), University research, intellectual property rights and the Dutch innovation systems, discussion paper for the Minister
of Economic Affairs.
Verspagen, B. (2006) University research, intellectual property rights and European innovation systems, Journal of Economic Surveys, 20,
pp. 608–632.
Welsh, R., Glenna, L., Lacy, W. and Biscotti, D. (2008) Close enough but not too far: assessing the effects of university-industry research
relationships and the rise of academic capitalism, Research Policy, 37, pp. 1854–1864.
Traditional Versus Heterodox Motives 695
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
sa
be
l M
ari
a B
od
as
 Fr
eit
as
] a
t 1
4:4
1 0
8 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
